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An Appre isa 1 of t Ise+ Ilarl ► t Wile 11()kjse :•turfy
rrom the Research slid Uevelopment Aq% , ncy Viewpoint
11y
l.•..el• rd Nstw i ve
Assistant c;vnei al Counsel
for Patent .Kat ter• , NAbA
Presented To
Nr ief inq Conferenc •e+ on Yrtont Law
boptember 2 6, 1'1b9
It not already done. I woul,	 ,tke O.o place the H&rbridye
House study in its context •;id indicate why such n study was
sought, and to give you sc.me insight into the general view
of t;le attorneys rel weentiny RW ayencies who were charged
with analysing the study's application to government patent
po.icV. I should further q-alify my remarks by stating that
they are an interpretation of the general views of the people
monitoring and analysing the Harbridye House study, and for
this reason, they may be relevant and pe rtineritl but as they
also represent the views of the 'surject" of the study, these
remarks may be dismissed as wholly incompetent, biased, and
irrelevant -- take your pick.
The 1963 Presidential Memorandum on Government Patent
Policy established the Patent Advisory Penal :index the Ped^-ral
Counc 1 . •^v 0 ^ 4 an.-a •nA Tor• hnn 1 ntv	 The w r-t i ve members of
L	 J - 1J -	 I - - -
	
A..	 • 4WWWqW 1,- w • .4W6I- • •
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this Panel, for the most part, were made uN of operet into
ayrncy j)aten' personnel. The Patent Advisory Notnel -onc, -ri-
trated its efforts on the Implementation and adrwinie • -ation
of the ., resident's Memorandum. In a concentrate . ' e! fort to
study in greater detail the principles established by tho
President's patent policy and to evaluate the effect of those
principles on the public interest, the ICbT establisheu the
cY-rnmittce on Government Patent Policy in Decembar 1965.
The Committee, in addition to acquiring members from tite
agencies on the Pec-oral Cuunc:l, also included representativee
from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and
the State Department. The committee thus reflected a broader
view than that held by the R&D agencies and, in effect, had a
higher mission titan the Patent Advisory Panel, that is, to
f
look at the overall government patent policy issue.
The Committee defined three basic patent pcli-.y questions.
These were the effects of alternate patent policy on (1)
achieving utilisation if government financed inventions,
(1) obtaining fullest pac L icipation of industry in quvertiment
RAD programs, and (3) competition in commercial markets. A
i
fuller discussion of these questions, if anyone is interested,
.	 I
con be found in the /C:.T Annual Meport on dovernmorit 1,er(,ent
Palley of June 1967 and lot Volume I of the Harbr id ,je Ik)usw
study.
After reviewing the various answers to tt ►aso policy
Issues offered by the literature and in tostlmany to Conyross,
the Committee felt that most cif these answers wore teased on
opinion on the part of Governm. • nt and industry representatives
and that little had been done to accumulate facts and data on
this sub)ect. Government patent policy wau, of course, a
highly controversial issue in the late f i fties and early sixties,
and chorgoo and counter-chargos , opinions based on personal
experience, self-interest, and sometimes ignorance b:istl©d
in the air. In the last few years, all this seems to have
died out, which perhaps attests to f, ' •.e basic soundness of the
President's Memorandum on Patent Policy, or to the fact that
the American public cannot cop* with the same issue for more
than a fern years at a time, It appears that gcv*rnmrent patent
I
policy is no longer news, or perhaps no one wants to speak on
this subject anymore without digesting the complete Harbridge
I	 House report -- a formidable task. That's probably why so
many of you are here lr+ay -- to find out what this report
is all about.
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ro t i 11 this inforeaat ion yap, the Committee on (iavernrwrit
Patent Policy contracted with Ilarbridge (louse, attrr a sol i^ ^-
t ` tlon, to accumulate the data ner-essary to forotilst• irstorma-
tive answers to the questions on the effect of qovernment patent
policy on utilization, participation and cometition. You nave
heard of these result s from Mr. Miller ' s resume and the views
of Professor Scherer, a person who, in my opinion, has a great
deal to offer us from his in-depth understanding of the yovern-
vent procurement system and economic theory. Ile is a very hard
act to follow -- I've tried before, failed miserably, but I'll
try again. Whi'.e I agree with most of the analyses and conclis-
•lone of Profes=or Scherer, I intend to offer the practical
view -- or, if you have, a majority view, held by the operating
patent personnel of the major government R&D agencies.
First, though, let me may that some of these people argue
against anyone taking this study seriously. While they consider
the study to be impressive and perhaps more quantitative or
qualitative than any study over perfotaed on government patent
policy, some question the validity of the data base, others
the type -3f 4ata col octed, or the conclusions drawn by
r
Harbridye )Wuse regardincj this data, and even whethrr any
questions at all have been answered by this study, except
tww to spend $400,0001 and, of course, some aryue t ►uat even
this lesson wasn't sufficient for some of us. Perhaps I'm
too hard on the critics ►sere. Lot no -jive you a feel for a
few specific criticism@ voiced ayainst this study.
1. Many of the f ind inc fe are based on attitude
Interviews of biased parties who know the
purpose of this studyr
2. There was a necessary interpretation by persons
filling out the que«tionnsires which renders
their answers questionable ar they knew the
purpose of the studyi
3. Many of the findings aru based on statistical
jdata subject to serious questions because of
the limitod number of responses. The regression
analysis, for example, used in the study suffers
from the fact that only a small nuaber of uses
were reportedi
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4. Tito limited nuaber of government-owned patents in
the •ample, and the fact teat in eume cases these
patents resulted in government ownership after _he
contractor did not exercise life option to obtain
title, seriously distorts the qualitative factors
of the sample t
S. A high nunnber of unreturned questionnaires --
only 2.024 of 3,390 sent were returned (60%),
which represented only 192 o! the 463 contractors
involved (41X), rendering the statistic&) data
questionable. Were the non-responders utilisers
or non-utilisers, or people who refused to license
their patents, or what?
6. The study may not apply to the President's
memorandum an the term -.ssed are different.
Basically, the term "prior experience" used
throughout the study is not equivalent to the
term "established nongovernmental commercial
posit ion" as it is used in the President's
memorandum.
Notwithstanding all the criticiser and skeptivisn+ vult-etH,
most of u• view the Harbridyo House report as a valuable addi-
tion to the patent literature, even though it did not establish
new concepts or make any unanticipated findings. After the
final reports were carefully analyzed, we were seriously con-
corned it we would be critisIz d for spending the taxpayers'
money to establish whet we already thought we knew to be the
case. Perhaps this was merely a yroup of patunt people
practicing hindsight on large scale. Certainly, the data
collected by Harbridge House is unique and will become more
valuable in the foreseeable future as an aid for future
rese&rchere.
Nov that we've looked at some of the criticiser, let's
see what the Harbridge House report basically says to us.
a. A single presumption of ownership to the inventions
flowing from government research and development
dose not provide a satisfactory basis for either
i	 a government-wide patent policy or for the patent
I	 policy of a single agency or goverment program
A"
-#j -
b. Operational f lax ibl l lty in t ►►e allocation  of
r igftte to invent tons result Sit-# f rows yovernment
9e6e4reh and deva loVMbent 1e rteodod fur te ►e
yoverrusent 4tioncies to accomplish their mission@
under differing mritractiny aituations.
The study indicated that to achieve (a) 11 ' Vic) tAllizs
-
tion of government sponsored ittvention•, (b) jAclyt= 1partici-
Dtion by industry in government research aixl devulaim"nt
proyrams, and (c) 1Acrl"94 cur29tition in the market place,
government patent policy had to consider factors such aei
1. The eissicon of the sponsoring c-jency, including
the purpose and nature of the particular contract
to be awardedi
2. The extent to which the Qovernrwent developed the
invention for public use and the promotional
activities of the sponsoring agenr-yl
3. The applica:oility and potential of the invention
to the commarcial market places
I	 4. The prior commercial experience of the contractor,
and the relationship of the contractor's privately
financed research and development to the government
works and
-y-
S. Tess else, natur e anti research orientation or
the Industry and market that Will be i,sinq tl ►e
Invent inn.
btated in at...ther way. t ►w Ilarbr idcje Miume study d isa-jrees
with the sintil4 Lv.AVm ion &hour , the all White or all black
position that wither the Government should have title to all
inventions lade tinder P&D sponsorship of an agency. or that
&1L the Government ever needs in a license to practice ttie
inventions made under its sponoorship. There are some easy
deciale,ns which may be readily made on wheth , or too Government
or a contractor should retain title to the results of a partic*%jlar
research *[fort. However. most of the decisions are in the
gray area where many of the factors notud by the Ilarbr idge
house • t Tidy must be cons ide red .
The si4rbridge 11ouse study backs the basic soundnesw of
a policy which permits decision on the allocation of ri ,lhts at
the time of contracting in certain situations where all the
I relevant facts, such as the mission of the agency, p%srpose of
the contrect, nature of the market, coswercial experience of
the contractor, intention of the agency to promote the
invention etc., are known. Where these facts are not char,
- tu-
the decision on the allocution or f  J h t 0 •?KsuId i,e do!arre•I
to a later time otter the Invention has Wen Idont i r too. All
I vi t 1 note, the basic arqumont by those wh+v were snalym in•l
the Itarbr idye IWuse study was what did the study stow about
drawing the line dividing the three Basic alternative* of
the Pre• ident's policy. whichchi are
1. knit -,&I option for title in the Uovernmont at
tHte t iwe of contracting (section 1 (a) h
2. initial option for title in the contractor at
the time of contracting l bect ion 1 (b) i or
2. deterring the decision until after the invention
waz idwnt i f ied (Section  1 (c) , grestor rights
under section 1(W.
Since the reason for this study was to examine the principles
of government patent policy, let us look in acnee detail at the
It^abridge House study as it applies to the Latent policy established
by the Presidential Memorandum. First  of all, Htarbr idg* House
taught us very little, it anything, about some elements of this
patent policy. Nothing conclusive was related ► rum t" study
to Sections 1(a) 3 and 1(a) 4 of the Preediential N~randum.
i
-I1-
You w ill rec% l l .+4ese sect tuns reyu i re U.* Govc rn-wnt to
retain the pr1n %; 9,,al rights to inventions in the t ► cnt
Instance when ti-e c •ont rac-t pertains to new fields of ac • i once,
and tochno u-jy it , which the cove r.uwent ties been mole or
pr lncil pal uovnlope- . And wiser: the •:'Vui.r it tu ►i of t ! t le by
a contractor mi•lht dive hits a domanant or ptc.terred rommer-
cial position [bnction 1(a)' j', and in the case where tno
contract requires the operation of a govex nment research
or production facility, or the coordination and direction of
the work of others (iiection l(a)41 .
!	 The study supported a presumption of the normal acquist-
tion of title by the Government whenever the purpose of the
I
contract was public orlinted since it • ndicated that exclusive
rights in the contractor were generally not necessary in order
to achieve the desired commercial utilisation whenever (a)
there is a waiting market for the results of the research.
(b) the results of the research are deve:cpod to completion in
a technical and commercial feasibility context, that *z,
little private technical Development is neodtd to market the
invention, and (c) the research it :ollow d up with promotional
and marketing activity by tho quvernment age•icy. This is the
I
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type of work carried on by most of ! he "public or ictntdd"
clovernmont agencies. Further, where the above factors are
present. and where there is little  additiona1 neve lopmont
coat necessary to work the inven .ion, IlarbridVe 11ouse found
that government retention of title • can ).to an effective spur
to competition' and greater utilization an 1 icenson are
3	 available to all comers.
tvet ►
 in these situations on inflexible presumption of
title in the Government is not in the public interest since
examples wore uncovered by the study where it appeared that
participat.on by industry may w a problem. For example, in
the case of a iatent sensitive industry, st)ch as exists in
the modicii ►al-chemistry area, flexibility was needed even
though the -ontracts fell under 5ectijn , (a) . The applit %tion
of the exceptional circumstances provisions %-nder section 1(a)
by the head of the agency was thought to provide sufficient
flexibility to effectively solve any participation problem
which fell under thts provision of th! Presidential Memorandum.
The 11arbridge House study also adequately presents a
case for the grant of "greater rights" to the contractor on
a case-by-case basis after the invention has been identified,
i
i
i
M13-
It such a grant is in the public interest. to achieve the
cnamercial uti 1 iastion of the invention. Title to so whether
or not the invention results from a contract under the title
section, &action 1(a), or the deferred Section 1(c). Where
the grant of such greater rights is a necessary incentive to
call forth private risk capital to briny the invention to the
point of practical apy 1 icat ion , or the contractor has substan-
tial equ ities in the invention, or the sponsorinq agency does
not intend to complete the devio lopswent of the invention, or
undertake its necessary promotion, the patent policy should
be flexible enough to provide for a balancing of the interests
of all the parties, including the public interest and to
accordingly allocate patent rights.
There is some recognition that, while Section 1(c) , the
deferred situation, is broad enough, a revision is required to
Section 1(a) which would permit cant- actors to obtain "greater
rights" after an invention had been identified even though
such invention may relate to health or welfare or to a product
I	 intended for use by the general public. This type of invwn-
tion is termed to be an "object invention" and, while it may
be necessary to provide a "t.yhter" test in determining whether
or not to grant exclusive rights to zontractors in "object
.1
wfi^
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inventions, " flexibility and guidelines to achieves r.,rh a
yrant are needed rather than an implication prohibitintl such
a grant as is presently found i ►. :,action I(&) of the i- residential
Memorandum.
The major area of disagreement is the application of the
study to bection 1(b) of the President's patent policy as it
affects the utiliratlon of inventions, the pa_rticiRatlon of
contractors in the government R&D program, anti the effect on
competition by the contractor's ownership of these inventions.
Section 1(b) provides that if L',* contracting circumstances
are not within :.action 1 (a) , then where the purpose of the
contract is to build upon existiny techno:ogy for use by t1ie
i
Government, as opposed to use by the general public, then the
contractor should normally acquire title when he has an
established nongovernmental commercial position directly
related to the field of the contract. Is this the correct
place to draw the line? The study can be considered to be
indecisive here. As to participation, the study attempted to
establish that the greater the correlation between a contractor's
private IR&D and the government work, and the greater his commer-
cial orientation, the greater was the likelihood that he would
refuse to participate in government work unless he was granted
-"	 w
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title to the results of such work. But at what point a
refusal to participate was reached was not identified t,y ttte
study. To some, bection 1(b) is far broader than is needwd
to solve the participation problem, and in practice today,
results in many contractors ob ► aininy title  to inventions
withoat even his direct reo vst therefor.
Section 1(b) is basically used by "mission oriented"
agencies (DOD) and the ►larbridge Mouse study found that
inventions made by these agencies are not generally applicable
to conc. •ircial uses. As to utilisation, the study further found
that these inventions often need more technical development for
their commercialisation than do inventions from the "public
oriented" agencies. The data also showed a statistical correla-
tion between increased commercial use and contractors t • -iny
both prior commercial experience and exclusive rights. Thus,
providing for the principal rights in the contractor in Section
1(b) situations would tend to match exclusive rights and coimwr-
cial experience -- the beet ingredients to reach utilisation.
However, there is doubt that the Harbridge House data is
statistically valid here, as in the cases studied, the contractor
had the initial option to acquire title to resulting inventions
•
•	
_l
- 
l b -
and most probably chose the inventions which tsad con~rt-ial
value. Also, some inventions were so related to Lite existing
products of the contractor that t •ie contractor would ,se tt ► e
invention with or without exclusive riwits. Thus, the study
failed to determine to what extent exclusive rights are a
factor in tits utilization of an Invention and in wt%at situa-
tions exclusive riyhts are necessary to achieve utilisation.
All it reported was that use was achieved and the contractor
had exclusive rights and prior experience.
further, as to competition, the study did reach tits con-
clusion that permitting contractors to retain exclusive rights
in inventions stemming from mission oriented R&D contracts did
not have an adverse effect on competition for two basis reasonso
(1) the rate of use of these inventions is low, and (2) con-
tractors were gone ally willing to license these inventions.
However, this may be discounted somewhat as there was little
analysis in the study on the practical conditions of the licenses
and no attempt was made to measure the accumulative effect of the
grant of patent rights stemming from government sponsored work
in a specific field of technology. Thus, it may be argued that
one may discoult the Harbridge House findinys that there was
no adverse effect on competition by the general retention of
title to inventions by contractors in 1(b) situations.
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A ma )car Issue thus becomes should the rr iter Ia t)f I (u) t ►e
severely tightened so that it would be applicable only to isolve
the participation problem. There is •omis validity to the artiti-
Gwent for this act ton. but Lite net of feet of suc t ► a ritantie wotj id
VPo that. in Lite sy )or ity of cases, the allocation  of rights to
invent ions would ue decided not at the t imo of contract into , trait
on an invention-by-invention basis.
A brief description of what this "an• "y too of value.
NASA presently uses a similar system, as it is required to do
so by its enabliny legislation. bo , we have some experience here.
The possibility of obtaining a "license clause" at Lite time of
contracting would dependupon a prospective contractor al,owiny
that he would not participate in the contractual effort without
such a clause. If his competitor would do so, such a position
would probably disqualify him for the receipt of the contract.
If he could not establish his need for a "license" patent clause,
he would receive a title clause, which I will call a "deferred"
clause, and which would operate very similarly to the present
"deferred" or "title" oatent clause of DOD, as th ese clauses
are, in effect, the same. Each time an invention was made and
the contractor desired to obtain "greater rights" or exclusive
rights to the invention, he would have to make such a request to
the contracting agency with sufficient documentation to support
-1 ►t-
the request. The sponsoring agency would have to rAview vacit
such request on a case-by-case basis and render a dotst• ion,
with adequate appoal rights reserved to the contractor. This
would result in large workloads in the larye mission ntlencie•
4XV), a workload which they are not presently staffed or
funded to undertake. rurther, if the sponsoring agency denied
a request for "greater r icifits" for one reason or another. it
would most probably have to patent the invention itself.
This is a much more difficult task for the Government to under-
take than it is for the contractor, basically for the reason
that the qovernment attorney and the inventor are separated by
both distance and organization.
if the sponsoring agency does not have adequate patent
personnel or budget to perform the necessary administrative
and professional tasks to obtain patent protection for the
invention, it loses whatever defensive value it may claim from
the issued patent, it loses the technical publication of the
patent specification, and the possibility of ever providing
an incentive by the grant of exclusive rights if such an
incentive in necessary to achieve utilisation.
- 1 40-
The administration of a patent pc,l lcy havin •l a ire
restrictive bectton 1(b) requires a larger potent rtarr and
a greater budget than is presently available fir e.svri purposes
in most larye wi ss icon or Sented a f lenc ies . Thus, there to great
hesitation on the part of these aclencies to eons iderr the
allocation of patent rights on a case-by -cASe
 t)asis.
The position tq
 retain the b road sweep of i,ect icon I(&)
can also rely on the Harbridge Clouse finding that the inventions
falling in tho present Section 1(b) category, while admittedly
of low utilisation, did achieve greater utilisation than other
inventions since the contractor had both prior experience and
exclusive rights. Also, exclusive rights did not adversely
affect competition since their utilisation rate was low and
tney usually were available for licensiny. And even if the
competition problem isn't solved, the '•arch-in" rights of
Section 1(b) and (c) would effectively alleviate this problem.
Yinally, the broad application of section 1(b) tend* to solve
the participation problem since we are dealing in an area where
the Government's work and the contractor's work are closely
related. The arguments against changing Section 1(b) at this
tins are the most persuasive.
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une should also owns ider anc,ther aspect o: i,qt dnt 1x,1 i(•y
that. i rresioect ive of the ck,vernment's policy on t hr a 1loc • at ton
o! ownership to inventions rosultiny rrcme mvernnoent six)nec, red
research and develo;,went with industry, the (,k)vernment , s potent
portfolio is going to continue to grow, une ansrer to c-Op,s
with this accumulation is the sucigest ion that toe Government
could solve this problem and save money by ret i ring . on 'ul 1
pay, all of its patent attorneys. T have yet to find a
government patent attc rney who disagrees with this suggestion.
Mother solution, discussed over the years by tt ►ose who
believe that it is impossible to stop this accumulation, and
which I believe is oupp arted by the llarbr idge House at-Ay,
is the grant of exclusive rights by the Government to a selected
applicant, for a limited period of time, as an incentive to
work the invention. The study found that when the invention
is not directly applicable to commercial uses and requires
substantial private development to perfect it, applies to ai
sma.l market, or is in a field occupied by patent sensitive
firms, and market potential alone is insufi'icient to achieve
use of the invention, exclusive right* may tend to promote
utilisation.
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wow. it trite inventiosi wee initially made try a -sovetnn"ant
contractor. it may kx. possible to grant !beck title to tits
Invent inq contractor it adequate assurances are obtained tf%at
the will promote the invention. 	 In many comes, trite to either
nut practical. or there to no sucti contractor. as tits invent ion
may tu♦ ve been derived from s government eerployee. A clear
policy is theretore needed Witch would provide tits guidance
to government agencies on yrantiny exclusive right• to other
parties in order to achieve this ut i l IZAt ion of the Invention.
